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edgment of what has happened to the
United Nations and an effort to rectify it. It
is to be hoped that the December 16, 1991
repeal of the Zionism is racism resolution by
the UN General Assembly marks the begin-
ning of a movement in that direction.
MALVINA HALBERSTAM
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law
Yeshiva University
State Support of International Terrorism: Legal,
Political, and Economic Dimensions. ByJohn
F. Murphy. Boulder: Westview Press,
1989. Pp. 121. Index.
Life today presents us with an omnipres-
ent terroristic melodrama. We are pum-
meled continually by images of terroristic
violence and oppression. These assail our
sense of well-being, filling us with fear,
hatred and an urge for vengeance. Herman
Melville described, years ago, the rage and
hatred felt by another generation. As Mel-
ville said of Ahab, we are plagued by lies,
but also by
truth with malice in it; all that cracks the
sinews and cakes the brain; all the subtle
demonisms of life and thought; all evil to
crazy Ahab, were visibly personified, and
made practically assailable in Moby Dick.
[Ahab] piled upon the whale's white
hump the sum of all the general rage and
hate felt by his whole race from Adam
down; and then, as if his chest had been a
mortar, he burst his hot heart's shell
upon it.'
So it is with us and terrorism. Terroristic
outrage is an omnipresent danger because
governments and rebels use it when "neces-
sary" to an important end. It infringes upon
our law, policy and individual thoughts, and
it is not likely to end with the ending of the
Cold War.2 The phenomenon calls for deep
thought and innovation.
Professor Murphy's book is a small ex-
pos6 on state support and sponsorship of
' H. MELVILLE, MOBY DICK 184 (Everyman's
Library 1988) (1851).
' Some traditional notions of international law
will be resurrected with the demise of the Cold
War, while others will remain interred. Reisman,
International Law after the Cold War, 84 AJIL 859
(1990).
terrorism. It is enjoyable, well written and
interesting, but its space limitations and
focus ultimately prevent it from advancing
the debate over what terrorism is or what to
do about it. Although the end of the Cold
War is a harbinger of hope, it may signal the
weakening of regional control and tempt an
exacerbation rather than a diminution of
terrorism. The book tries to address the
problem of terrorism while avoiding the de-
vastating reality of its ubiquity; although
not aimed at the scholar, it manifests
Murphy's rich talent and expertise and
whets our appetite for a sequel.
The impetus for this project (and perhaps
another reason for its limited focus) seems
to have been a report by Defense Systems,
Inc. (DSI). Murphy distills out of DSI's list
of types of terrorism, state sponsorship and
state support (pp. 33-38). He provides a
good overview of current mainstream West-
ern thinking on some aspects of state terror-
ism and a succinct and accessible summary
of many basic traditional, Cold-War-driven
ideas, issues and sources. The space limita-
tions, intended audience, perspective and
choice of sources, however, restrict the
book's impact. We await the application of
Murphy's expertise to a sequel critically
scrutinizing the ideas presented in this ex-
pose.
Chapter 1 briefly describes the debate
over defining terrorism, reporting some
U.S. and European academic and govern-
mental definitions without really entering
the fray. Murphy believes that the debate
over definition is not productive, but he
does not explain in any depth why not. His
goal-to develop a nonideological ap-
proach to terrorism-is laudable, but again
the limitations of space and focus prevent its
fulfillment. Murphy is limited to describing
only one point of view, without hard scru-
tiny of any. He rejects as unhelpful a "ge-
neric" definition of terrorism and avoids
discussing the profound moral and political
implications of conduct promoting national
liberation movements or of governmental
reaction to them.' Indicating that "states
3 See Randall, The Politics of Terrorism (Book Re-
view), 1 CRIM. L. F. 347, 348 (1990). I empa-
thize, having wrestled with the problem myself.
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unfriendly to the United States and other
Western democracies" follow the path of
using "terrorism as a kind of surrogate war-
fare, .... a substitute for more conven-
tional means," he then notes that, "taking a
broader view, some have alleged that the
U.S. government itself is a major sponsor of
international terrorism" (p. 1). Unfortu-
nately, he has no space to analyze the differ-
ence between what the "anti-Western-de-
mocracy states" do and the "broader view."
It would be interesting to scrutinize specific
conduct by most states-not only antago-
nists of the West-to see whether they all
use "terrorism as a kind of surrogate war-
fare," at least when important national secu-
rity interests are involved. More scrutiny,
distinguishing the broader view from
terrorism as surrogate warfare, would be
welcome.
Murphy sets out to develop "a typology
of state support and sponsorship of terror-
ism that minimizes reference to specific
states, and to define international terror-
ism, state support and state sponsorship,
without depending on political ideology"
(p. 2). Despite his good faith and articulate
effort, the book's brevity and focus cause
him to slight the very painful issues that
would enlighten the reader and prevent
him from meeting his avowed goal of com-
ing up with an original, neutral, nonpoliti-
cal or even nonideological discussion of
terrorism. He avoids the sticky problem of
defining terrorism generically, wishing only
to analyze state terrorism in a way that fo-
cuses on particular acts already perceived
and proscribed as international terrorism
(p. 2). He does enlighten the nonspecialist,
briefly showing how multilateral treaties re-
quire states to prosecute or extradite indi-
viduals charged with specific, proscribed
conduct (hijacking, hostage taking, torture,
bombing civilians, and crimes against inter-
nationally protected persons) that is gener-
ally recognized as terrorist; but space con-
straints and desire to avoid a quagmire pre-
See C. BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, DRUGS, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF Hu-
MAN LIBERTY (at press, 1992); Blakesley, The
Modern Blood Feud: Thoughts on the Philosophy of
Terrorism, 33 CATH. LAW. 177 (1990).
vent him from analyzing what it is about this
conduct that makes it terrorist or criminal.
While most of us would readily consider this
conduct terroristic, we are not provided
with insight into the required criminal ele-
ments.
Thus, owing to space constraint or inten-
tion, the author does not address the seem-
ingly intractable conundrums posed by the
interrelationship of world politics, violence,
morality, ideology and law. This avoidance
of the moral dilemma that permeates what
he calls the definitional quagmire combines
with his other constraints to derail his effort
to come to grips with state terrorism and
erodes his opportunity to advance the de-
bate on it.
It may well be, as Murphy suggests, that
the most efficient way to deal with terror-
ism is to prohibit specific conduct rather
than some generic mega-crime called
terrorism. Nevertheless, as he also recog-
nizes (p. 3), we live in a world where terror-
ism is a reality and where the term is utilized
for good or for evil. Thus, it is necessary to
wrestle with it and its conceptualization-to
come to grips with the principle or princi-
ples that make hijacking, hostage taking,
killing diplomats, or bombing a civilian
neighborhood or a Pan Am flight terror-
ism. To say that conduct is punishable be-
cause it is proscribed, and that it is pro-
scribed because states agree that it is terror-
ism, obviously begs the analytical question.
The problem with the inductive approach
by itself is that unless we distill the essential
principles of the conduct that has been con-
demned by international and domestic law
to see what makes it terrorist, we gain no
conceptual insight and have no standards.
We have a system like that of ancient com-
mon law England, without principles, pol-
icy, coherence or conceptual integrity. Ana-
lysts must discern principles behind the sim-
ple agreements or decisions.4 Otherwise, we
agree that international law is nothing more
than the "will of the sovereign(s)," giving in
to the tendency evident among some politi-
cal scientists and manifest in the rhetoric of
the so-called war against terrorism (or
4 D. P. MOYNIHAN, ON THE LAW OF NATIONS
109 (1990).
1992] 429
HeinOnline -- 86 Am. J. Int'l L. 429 1992
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
drugs). Law becomes nothing more than a
propagandistic exercise, in or by which the
greatest power almost always wins.
Murphy's insistence on the difficulty of
coming up with "a generic definition"
misses the point. It is not as important to
develop a generic definition as it is to cap-
ture the essence of the social evil and legal
wrong(s) that terrorism represents. Murphy
emphasizes sanctioning; but we must under-
stand what social harm we are sanctioning
and why. His analysis of the international
law of sanctions, like that of many commen-
tators, is wanting, because he discusses pen-
alties as if they were mere politics. That may
be what politicians think and want, but it
loses sight of the basic principle of penal ju-
risprudence: nulla poena sine lege. Imposing
punishment or sanction is penal in nature,
although many politicians indicate other-
wise. For application of a legal penalty to be
appropriate, proof of elements constituting
a prohibited social harm is required. The
basis for sanction must be principled and ar-
ticulated in advance. If the purpose is not
legal but political-if sanctions are political
tools to be used against one's enemies-we
should recognize that and not implicate
"the rule of law." To refer to political man-
agement of others as the rule of law is to
debase the latter. It is not surprising that
this deficiency hampers Murphy's analysis;
it also afflicts much international penal law
(and commentary thereon). There are
twenty-two categories of international
crimes, representing 314 international in-
struments enacted between 1815 and 1988,
none of which has properly defined the of-
fenses proscribed or provided the rudimen-
tary elements for the establishment of
"guilt."5 Of course, incorporation into na-
tional law, by promulgating explicit penal
elements to be proved, rectifies the defi-
ciency domestically. But that leaves interna-
tional law insufficient, invigorating the
claim that international law is not law at all.
Yet many internationalists are willing to ac-
5 See Blakesley, Introduction to the Draft Con-
vention for an International Criminal Tribunal 5
(presented to Eighth United Nations Congress on
the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders, 1990); 1 & 2 M. C. BASSIOUNI, INTER-
NATIONAL CRIMS: DIGEST/INDEX OF INTERNA-
TIONAL INSTRUMENTS 1815-1985 (1986).
cept this exercise in vagueness and futility;
perhaps they just do not notice.
If we are talking about a rule of law, it is
not appropriate to punish an individual, a
group or a nation for vague, undefined con-
duct. We must determine the concrete actus
reus, mens rea, and proscribed social harm.
Murphy wants to avoid any political applica-
tion, but his approach actually implies ap-
proval of just that. The failure to address
the essential and specific evil of terrorism
(in both a generic and a specific sense) pre-
vents him (and most commentators) from
developing an original thesis that would
help us to understand what it is about cer-
tain conduct that makes it terrorist and
punishable.
Although he believes it is futile to try to
define terrorism generically, Murphy ad-
mits that it would be wise to proscribe "ma-
jor forms of terrorist acts currently ne-
glected by international treaty law" (p. 22).
One wonders how this can be done without
coming to grips with what it is that makes
such conduct terroristic and what elements
must be proved to penalize it. He notes that
bombing of civilians and theft of military
nuclear material are terrorist but does not
analyze in depth why or when this is so.
(Would theft of nuclear material be crimi-
nal terrorism if done in peacetime, to pre-
vent the development of nuclear weapons
or to prevent an enemy from using it mili-
tarily?) He suggests that actions in support
of national liberation and repressive re-
sponses by target governments themselves
raise profound issues of law and morality
that deserve a great deal more analysis than
they have received to date. However, he be-
lieves that "clear analysis of these issues is
hindered rather than helped by treating
them as part of the problem of terrorism"
(id.). To suggest this, without analyzing why
already developed offenses ought to be
punished as terroristic offenses for some
reason other than just because nations have
agreed to do so, begs the question and be-
lies what is really a simple reiteration of a
positivistic, status quo policy orientation.
Similarly, justification of the U.S. intercep-
tion of the Egyptian airliner carrying the hi-
jackers of the Achille Lauro and equivoca-
tion over the U.S. bombing of Libya sug-
gest an assumption of a particular political
perspective or orientation. An intention not
430 [Vol. 86
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to present an in-depth analysis of these
events (p. 102), along with mere iteration of
one position, undermines his attempt to
provide a test of illegality based on the
means, rather than the goal, of prohibited
conduct. One hopes that he will add more
of his own rich ideas to the scholarly debate,
either by critiquing the positions he reports
or by presenting arguments in their favor.
Chapter 3 describes the role of Western
intelligence networks, their deficiencies and
their potential to combat state terrorism.
Murphy presents an interesting summary of
some of the U.S. law related to intelligence
surveillance at home and abroad. He notes
the tension between constitutional princi-
ples and the need for intelligence to combat
terrorism, but he avoids analysis of the ten-
sion and withholds his views. Chapter 4 de-
scribes the options of diplomacy, protest, in-
ternational claims and transnational litiga-
tion as desirable, peaceful ways to combat
terrorism. The use of civil remedies in the
Alien Tort Statute,6 in civil Racketeer-In-
fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO)7 cases and in the criminal provisions
of RICO' is discussed. Again, we are not
given Murphy's opinion on the viability,
wisdom or constitutionality of these reme-
dies. The discussion of the Alien Tort Stat-
ute is limited to Tel-Oren.9 It does not men-
tion Amerada Hess, which held that the
Alien Tort Statute does not apply to actions
against foreign states.' ° Some discussion of
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA) as a vehicle for litigation against
state sponsors or supporters of terrorism,
focusing on whether the FSIA's exceptions
6 28 U.S.C. §1350 (1988).
7 18 U.S.C. §§1961-1968.
As done in United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d
42 (2d Cir. 1983).
' Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d
774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003
(1985). Murphy discusses briefly Professor Koh's
interesting article, Civil Remedies for Uncivil
Wrongs: Combatting Terrorism Through Transna-
tional Public Law Litigation, 22 TEx. INT'L L.J.
169 (1987), but does not analyze in depth or cri-
tique the argument that such matters ought to be
battled out in Congress rather than in the courts.
"' Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Ship-
ping Corp., 109 S.Ct. 683 (1989). It is likely that
the decision was published after he finished writ-
ing the book.
to sovereign immunity allow federal juris-
diction, would have been apt." Murphy
would have a lot to contribute to the debate
on the political question doctrine and the
wisdom of litigating these matters.
Chapter 5 considers the application of
economic sanctions to prevent or punish
state support and sponsorship of terrorism,
contrasting them with the use of force. Al-
though he generally concludes that actions
taken by the United States and its allies
were appropriate, Murphy advocates re-
straint in the use of force to combat or pun-
ish state terrorism. His distinction between
sponsorship (pp. 33-38) and support (pp.
33-34, 108-109, and 120) of terrorism,
and his point that force is more appropri-
ate in reaction to the former, are interest-
ing, but not elaborated. Quite taken with
Professor Keith Highet's "draconian" and
"sweeping" economic sanctions against
states sponsoring terrorism, Murphy is
rightfully hesitant about the use of force,
but an elaboration of the analytical differ-
ences and the value of choosing the sort of
"civil death [penalty]" for nations involved
in sponsoring terrorism (p. 78) rather than
the use of physical force would have been
interesting. The concept of terrorism could
have been illuminated by analysis of how
and why the most draconian level of eco-
nomic sanction (oppression and slow death
by starvation and lack of medical care for
the entire population) differs from what he
considers terrorism. Unfortunately, again,
we are not treated to an in-depth explana-
tion or analysis. In addition, Murphy seems
to assume that economic sanctions would be
applicable only against enemies of the
"1 See Randall, supra note 3, at 353-54. This
will be even more interesting when Murphy is
able to consider the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990,
S. 2465 (the Grassley-Heflin bill), to supplement
18 U.S.C. §2331, currently being discussed be-
fore the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Sub-
committee on Courts and Administrative Prac-
tice. This act would establish an express right to
victims of terrorism to recover damages from its
perpetrators. The Department ofJustice and the
State Department have argued that this act ought
not to apply to any government or government
official, because of the FSIA. See Zagaris, Senate
Holds Hearings on Anti-Terrorism Act Designed to
Provide Victims of Terrorism with Opportunities to Sue
Terrorists, 6 INT'L ENFNIT. L. REP. 293 (1990).
19921
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United States. The discussion of economic
sanctions, like the book, seems to suffer
from his refusal to discuss the "broader
view" of terrorism.
Murphy wants to emphasize the means
rather than the goals of force and argues
that the laws of war and the UN Charter are
to govern intervention. He aptly suggests
that any broad principle allowing humani-
tarian intervention is dangerous. In his
cavil against the eloquent McDougal/
Reisman defense of the raid on Entebbe
and his hairsplitting quibble with Professor
Schachter's analysis of the attempt to rescue
U.S. hostages in Iran,12 Murphy shuns in-
depth critique, so misses the chance to fur-
ther the discussion of another important, al-
beit thorny issue. We know that, like
Highet, Murphy would apply draconian eco-
nomic sanctions, but we are left wanting to
know why, how and when these are more
appropriate than limited use of force. His
discussion of the use of armed force is an
interesting introductory description of
some other scholars' views. He whets our
appetite for his significant expertise to elab-
orate and apply his cautious views on force
to the definition of terrorism.
Murphy is less than sanguine about the
efficacy of international adjudicatory (or
even arbitral) remedies in relation to state-
sponsored terrorism (p. 59), using the Ni-
caragua v. United States case (pp. 59-60) to
present his skepticism and belief that they
degenerate into ideological sniping. Here
again, it would have been interesting to see
some analysis of why he feels this is so and
how this is different from other litigation. Is
his dissatisfaction with international adjudi-
cation based on the fact that ideology deter-
mined the outcomes or on the victory of an
opposing ideology? Certainly, adjudication
is fraught with political and ideological
overtones. Is it really so different, in terms
of its political or ideological tenor, from ad-
judication in domestic systems?
State Support of International Terrorism is a
useful primer for someone with a general
interest in the subject. It is a brief, well-writ-
ten, interesting survey of contemporary,
mainstream thought on the subject of
2 See McDougal & Reisman, Letter to the Edi-
tor, N.Y. Times, July 16, 1976, at A20; Randall,
Book Review, supra note 3, at 353.
terrorism. It presents some incipient
thoughts that ought to be expanded. With-
out deep scrutiny, it also presents state and
individual terrorism through the prism of
the traditional, state-developed instruments
and interpretation. Murphy aimed to pro-
vide a nonpolitical analysis, but the very
foundation of his study, perhaps like that of
any study, is. political. Avoidance of the
tough issues exacerbates the problem. It
would have been helpful to have more in-
depth criticism or analysis of the academic
positions described. We would all profit
from having Murphy's broad experience
and keen analytical skills applied to elabora-
tion, analysis and critique of what he sets
forth here.
CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY
Louisiana State University
Whalen, Richard J., and R. Christopher
Whalen (eds.). Trade Warriors: The Guide
to the Politics of Trade and Foreign Invest-
ment. Washington, D.C.: The Whalen
Company, Inc., 1990. Pp. v, 467. Index.
$34.95.
Any study of the formulation of trade pol-
icy should encompass more than the exami-
nation of legal theories such as "most fa-
vored nation treatment" or the "act of
state" doctrine. The drafting of legislation,
or the execution of law, is affected by the
philosophy of the persons involved. After a
short survey of recent trade issues, this
book proceeds to examine the personalities
that shape U.S. trade policy.
Richard Whalen and R. Christopher
Whalen are the editors of this book; other
writers and collaborators are identified in
an appendix note on sources. The back
cover prominently identifies the Whalen
Company, Inc., as "one of Washington's
oldest political consulting and communica-
tions firms, founded in 1970."
In an opening discussion on the historical
perspective of U.S. trade relations, Trade
Warriors quotes authors and congressional
personnel for their view of the evolution of
current U.S. trade and foreign investment
policy. The major issues noted include the
United States-Japan disputes on FSX air-
craft production, the Semiconductor Trade
Agreement and the Structural Imperatives
[Vol. 86
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